政治动员、地方性知识与区域合作的困境——基于长三角的考察

The Dilemma of Political Mobilization, Local Knowledge and Regional Cooperation—Based on the Investigation of the Yangtze River Delta

中文关键词:  区域合作；政治动员；长三角；历史社会学

英文关键词:regional cooperation, political mobilization, the Yangtze River Delta, historical sociology

中文摘要:

      从历史社会学的分析维度，对半个多世纪以来长三角一体化发展进程进行考察，对区域合作的背后博弈机制进行探讨。一个基本发现是，基于国家意志的政治动员既是区域一体化能够不断被发起的重要原因，同时也是区域一体化发展面临困境的潜在因素。基于国家意志的政治动员要求长三角区域内各地政府有“一盘棋”思想，但基于发展主义的央—地激励机制，以及行政分权改革与相应的财税体制，决定了各地政府有着明确而清晰的责任边界，由此产生了明确的地方性利益诉求。各地政府基于自己的利益诉求，形成了区域合作的地方性认知。这种地方性知识，客观上对基于政治动员的国家意志的有效实现产生了较大的消解效应。

英文摘要:

      Based on the analytical dimension of historical sociology, this paper investigates the integration development process of the Yangtze River Delta for more than half a century and discusses the game mechanism behind regional cooperation. One of the basic findings of this study is that political mobilization based on national will is not only an important reason for the continuous initiation of regional integration, but also a potential factor for the dilemma of regional integration development. The political mobilization based on the national will requires the local governments in the Yangtze River Delta region to have the thought of “a game of chess”. However, the central and local incentive mechanism based on developmentalism, as well as the reform of administrative decentralization and the corresponding fiscal and taxation system, determine that local governments have clear and clear responsibility boundaries, thus there is a clear demand for local interests. Based on their own interests, local governments have formed a local cognition of regional cooperation. This kind of local knowledge objectively has a great dissolving effect on the effective realization of national will based on administrative mobilization.