从日语角度析维特根斯坦对“感觉私有论”的围剿

Wittgenstein’s Criticism of the Notion on the Privacy of Sensations Revisited

中文关键词:  私人语言；私人感觉；日语；黏着语；主—谓逻辑；行为主义；笛卡尔主义

英文关键词:private language, the privacy of sensations, Japanese language, agglutinative language, subject-predicate logic， behaviorism, Cartesianism

中文摘要:

      后期维特根斯坦对“私人语言”观的批判，是建立在他对“感觉私有论”批判的基础上的。然而，不太为学界所重视的是，在撰写作为《哲学研究》之准备资料的《大打字稿》时，维特根斯坦曾经提出过一条非常新颖的用以批判“感觉私有论”的思路。该思路的大旨是，德语中的主—谓结构在感觉表述领域中的运用，将非常容易引诱德语哲学家去认定，像疼痛这样的感觉，乃是疼痛主体的某种“私有物”。而在维氏看来，只要我们重新构造一种能够摆脱上述主—谓逻辑思维之桎梏的新感觉表达方式，“感觉私有论”的幻觉亦可随之消失。然而，维氏为设计这种新表达方式而引入的行为主义表达方式，依然会在日常语用环境中遇到种种难题，因此，其可操作性亦大为成疑。其实，如果维特根斯坦能够参考日语中的疼痛表达方式的话，上述难题就会得到纾解。具体而言，日语具有关于疼痛的“主观现象化”与“客观名词化”两个系列的表达方式，而即使在后一个系列中，日语言说者也没有明确诉诸行为主义对于疼痛的表述方式。因此，维特根斯坦的论证如果能够以日语为主要表述手段的话，那么其说服力就会大为增强。从这个角度看，维特根斯坦对以印欧语为基点的传统西哲思辨方式的批判，在客观上乃是为一种以非印欧语为基点的新哲学思维方式的展开初步扫清了障碍。

英文摘要:

      It is widely known that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s criticism of the notion of “private language” is based on his criticism of the notion on the “privacy of sensations”. However, his ideas had long been ignored by scholars. In his Big Typescript, which can be regarded as one of the preparatory materials of Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein did attempt to elaborate a novel argument against the putative privacy of sensations. His argument goes like this: The subject-predicate pattern imbedded in German expressions, when applied to the expressions on sensations like pain, does easily induce German-speaking philosophers to suppose that the sensations in question are privileged by the relevant subjects. However, as Wittgenstein continues, if we can invent a new form of expressions on sensations in which the subject-predicate logic no longer plays any pivotal role, then the philosophical ideas surrounding the notion of the “privacy of sensations” would be immediately disenchanted as well. But Wittgenstein’s forgoing argument is by far unassailable. A critical problem unnoticed by him is that the behaviorist elements introduced in his new expressions would inevitably make them too clumsy to use in ordinary linguistic practice. An easy solution to this problem is to appeal to Japanese language. To be more specific, in Japanese, there are two series of expressions on pain: in the first one, the notion of pain is deobjectied and hence immune to subject-predicate logic, while in the second one, it is objectified. However, even in the second one, the notion of pain is introduced in a manner immune to behaviorist expressions, which are themselves problem-makers in many aspects. Hence, Wittgenstein could make his argument even more convincing if he could speak Japanese. And in this sense, the paper holds that Wittgenstein’s criticism of the centrality of the Indo-European languages in philosophical speculations is potentially leading to a new form of philosophy, in which the importance of non-Indo-European languages as new linguistic tools for philosophy will be treated properly.